Another Theology Blog

Today, I came across an article about bishop Soto’s heroic defense of the Church’s teaching on homosexuality.  I encourage all of you to read about what this loyal son of the Church did.  Please offer a prayer of thanksgiving as well.

Overall, the article received very positive comments.  One negative comment really jumped out at me though.

If 12th Century biology is correct about human biology and genetics, then the Bishop is 100% correct. If objective science has a different biological anthropology which has evolved at all then it may throw the Theology into question. Too bad this topic is too politically motivated to seek a true dialogue between modern science and theology.

Simply put, this statement is an expression of what has come to be known as “moral fallibilism.”

Essentially, moral fallibilism holds things have value because we want them.  Hence, everything that’s wanted has de facto value.  On the other hand, everything we ought to want has de jure value.  Moral fallibilists argue it’s the duty of the scientific method, applied to ethical claims, to sort out what has de jure value from what has only de facto value.

The problem with moral fallibilism is quite obvious:  empirical science can’t tell you what’s right and wrong.  Any argument to the contrary is rendered invalid due to the Naturalistic Fallacy:  deriving ought from is.  The only task of empirical science is to provide a present description of physical facts and then forecast a future description.

For the life of me, I can’t understand why some people don’t see this!  

In order to derive moral imperatives from material observations, we must first have an ethical framework.  This is pretty much self-evident.

For example, suppose I went up to a mountain and lived as a hermit for thirty years.  In my solitude, I acquired the notion that making oysters orange is good.  In fact, as I laughed hysterically, I decided that turning oysters orange is better than everything else, even the survival of mankind!  One day, I returned to civilization.  Upon my arrival, I heard about a new technology that would release chemicals into the ocean and cause all oysters to become orange.  However, these chemicals would ultimately kill half of mankind.  I shrugged my shoulders and supported the new technology anyway.  It worked!  All the oysters are now orange, and one out of every two humans on earth is now dead.

“Making oysters orange in color is good” doesn’t follow from “this technology would release chemicals into the ocean and cause all oysters to become orange.” 

“Killing half of mankind is bad” doesn’t follow from “these chemicals would ultimately kill half of mankind.”  

“Turning oysters orange is better than anything else, even the survival of mankind” doesn’t follow from “a new technology would release chemicals into the ocean and cause all oysters to become orange, killing half of mankind in the process.”

Making oysters orange is good, because I said so.  Killing people is bad, because I value human life, not for any scientific reason (because there aren’t any), but for a philosophical reason (which I won’t explain here, because you probably already know it).  Turning oysters orange is better than preserving the lives of millions, because I said so.

That was a nice little excursion through Hypothetical Land, wasn’t it?  Now, back to reality!

Strictly speaking, there’s only a one-way street from morality to empirical science.  What we value affects our research (namely what we research and what we do with it), but our research never affects what we value.  Other things, such as religion and experience, affect our values.

Some folks might balk at this.  Surely scientific research affects our values in some way?  

Yes, I suppose it does.  But only indirectly.  If the institutions we get our moral values from make any empirical claims, and science proves (or at least seems to prove) these empirical claims false, then we tend to lose our trust in that institution’s claims in general.  Consequently, we begin to question the value system we received from that institution, and check see if it matches up with our “lived experience” (as some people so fondly call it).

The truth is simple.  Homosexuals want to have sex with other men (or women) because sex feels good and women (or men) don’t arouse them.  Advocates of homosexual rights say it’s okay to have sex with other men (or women) because sex feels good and it doesn’t hurt anybody.  Opponents of homosexual rights say it’s not okay to have sex with other men (or women) because even though sex feels good, it hurts people if it’s had outside a marriage between one man and one woman.

Advancements in the field of biology don’t even enter into the equation.  Morality doesn’t advance in a linear fashion like technology.  Ancient Greece had bath houses reserved for homosexual orgies.  Colonial Philadelphia didn’t.  Modern San Francisco does.  Ancient Rome had abortuaries.  Napoleonic France didn’t.  Modern New York does.

Let’s stop pretending that having cool toys makes us good people, because that’s exactly what we’re doing when we say technologically advanced civilizations are morally superior.  

Just watching an episode of Stargate: SG-1 should dispel that notion.